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CONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE:
ZAIRE
Peter Rosenblum*
Mobutu Sese Seko has ruled Zaire since 1965. His quarter century in
power has been characterized by corruption, economic decay and violations
of basic human rights. That is not, in itself, exceptional. Other authori-
tarian states in Africa and elsewhere share many of the same qualities in
varying degrees. What is exceptional, however, is the scale. Corruption is
legendary; economic decay is all pervasive; degradation of human rights
is palpable in every sector of the society.
With democratic changes coming to many parts of the world, the
Mobutu government has been under sustained attack since the beginning
of 1990. Nevertheless, as this article is written, it continues to fend off
the final attack.' Even its demise is unlikely to end the authoritarian
structures which it put into place.
There are many lenses through which to view the Mobutu phenome-
non: product of the cold war, creature of American policy in southern
Africa, or the result of a tortured colonial history and a botched decol-
onization. All of these are important aspects of a story that cannot,
however, ignore the internal mechanisms by which President Mobutu has
maintained power and created his own brand of authoritarianism. His
longevity, itself, is now the exception.
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York.
The research for this paper was undertaken in connection with a project for the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights. All interviews were conducted by the author together with Makau wa
Mutua, then director of the Africa Project at the Lawyers Committee and co-author of the Lawyers
Committee's 1990 study of Human Rights in Zaire, Zaire: Repression as Policy. The views expressed
herein are the author's but they emerge from more than 2 years of collaboration with Makauwa
Mutua to whom thanks are due.
1. During the so-called "Popular Consultation" that took place between January and March,
1990, thousands of Zairians presented their startlingly frank views of the President's rule. On April
24, 1990, President Mobutu announced an end to his one-man rule. He called for the revitalization
of the three traditional branches of government and announced an immanent return to some form
of multi-party rule. Soon afterwards, he also spoke of putting a "human face" on the security
forces. Nevertheless, while opposition has mounted and opposition views are expressed openly,
Mobutu has not been willing to cede real power or to submit his rule to a contested election.
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In the course of more than twenty-five years, President Mobutu has
effectively consolidated political power, eliminating most serious individual
and political opposition. The system developed quickly from the moment
that he took power. He eliminated existing political parties and created
his own party, the Popular Movement for the Revolution (MPR). Through
successive Constitutional revisions between 1967 and 1974, the MPR
became both the sole legal party and the sole "institution" permitted in
the country. Not only was every Zairian a member from birth, each
Zairian had the constitutional duty to work for its goals. Through the
MPR, whose ideology - "Mobutism" - was no more than the "ideas,
thoughts and actions" of President Mobutu, the President exercised
constitutional authority over every aspect of Zairian political and social
life.
The President's success has been due, in part, to his mastery of
political intrigue and manipulation. But, in this, as in all elements of
domestic affairs, violent repression has never been far below the surface.
The enforcers of Mobutism are the army and the overlapping network of
security forces, composed of police, presidential guard and intelligence
services. In the process of consolidating power in Mobutu's Zaire, the
security forces in particular have played a prominent role and have
achieved unassailable political power. They are unconstrained by their
own mandates, the law, and even the declared policy of the government.
In effect, they constitute a shadow government, to which both the ap-
pointed government and the population are subject.
This paper is about the security forces which grew with Mobutu's
state and played a fundamental role in his consolidation of power between
1965 and 1990. It is a case history on the theme of creating an authoritarian
state. It is indirectly about the prospects for sustained democratic change
in Zaire, so long as the security forces remain strong and resistant to
change. Part one describes the structure and operations of the security
forces; part two addresses the judicial role, with particular emphasis on
repeated "reforms," purportedly intended to rein in the security force
and make them accountable for their violations of law and human rights.
Part I Security Forces in the Second Republic
It was as an officer in the army that Mobutu twice took power in
Zaire, first in 1960 and then definitively in 1965. After the 1965 coup,
the President depended on the army and frequently appointed ministers
from among army colleagues. Subsequently, however, he ended his reliance
on the army and came to treat the officers to the same skepticism he
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accorded to political adversaries.2 While favoring selected units, he acted
decisively to prevent any officer or unit from consolidating power. The
army was physically, and figuratively, banished to the fringes.
President Mobutu instead began to rely on favored army units and
specialized security forces, organized within the National Security Council
over which he presided. The Council is composed of his Security Advisor
and the heads of the major security organs. The Security Advisor has
typically been one of the most powerful individuals in the state, involved
not only in a wide variety of questions of internal security, but in other
matters as well, even foreign relations.3
The four premier security organs represented in the Council and
present throughout most of the country are the Gendarmerie Nationale,
the Garde Civile, the Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection
(SNIP) and the Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaires (SARM).
The first two are police forces with general mandates, while the latter
two are "specialized services" whose particular mission is to protect the
state against subversive activities.
These forces are the primary focus of this paper, but they are far
from being the only security forces of importance. One of the most
important security forces, for purposes of protecting the system built by
the President, is the Special Presidential Division (DSP), the President's
personal defense force. It is reputedly the best trained, the best armed
and the best paid of the forces. It is also reputed to be composed entirely
of foreigners and men from the President's ethnic group.
There are also a number of specialized divisions of the Zairian Armed
Forces (FAZ) as well as specialized security forces attached to certain
state enterprises, such as Gecamine. Also, during the years of the Second
Republic, members of CADER, the security section of the MPR youth
movement, figured prominently.
What has characterized each of these forces is its independence with
respect to other forces and its direct dependence on the President. These
2. A number were executed in connection with a reported coup attempt. Others, like General
Mukobo Mudende, originally from Bandundu, were banished at the point that their credibility at
home and abroad became a threat.
3. For most of the Second Republic, the position was filled by Seti Yale, one of the three
so-called "White Ngwandi" prominent in state affairs throughout President Mobutu's rule. (The
other two are Kengo wa Dondo, see infra note 27, who rose to prominence as the Procureur Generale
and Justice Minister in the 1970s before serving as Prime Minister for most of the 1980s, and Bemba
Saolona, see infra note 49, president of Scibe-Zaire Group and the dominant businessman in the
country.) His successor, Nkema Liloo, grew to nearly equal prominence before he was replaced by
the human rights minister, Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi, in May 1990.
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have been important elements in President Mobutu's version of "divide
and rule." One high-level official of the MPR described the multitude of
security forces as behaving like the jealous wives of a polygamous man.4
Each force, he said, competes to identify threats to security that only it
can solve. Each force also maintains its own detention facilities and enjoys
a high degree of independence in other areas as well. It is this independence
and the means at their disposal which the security forces use as a source
of profit and power for themselves and the state.
The Police - The Gendarmerie Nationale and Garde Civile
During the colonial and early independence period, the police function
was fulfilled primarily by two separate, but overlapping forces. One was
a branch of the armed forces known after 1959 as the "Gendarmes."
The other was the territorial police, formed in 1926 and responsible to
local provincial authorities. A smaller, third force, the "Chief's Police,"
functioned in rural areas. This third force was, however, largely untrained
and unarmed.'
The Gendarmes were one of the two arms of the colonial army, the
Force Publique. 6 The other arm, the regular military forces or troupes
campkes, played an important role in putting down domestic disturbances,7
although they were trained primarily to combat foreign invasions. The
Gendarmes, in contrast, were established to fulfill a permanent constab-
ulary function.
Relations were tense between the two police organs and were marked
by frequent friction. The Gendarmes were intended to be "national" in
composition. Belgian law required that "at least four tribes ... be
represented in each platoon." 8 While they were to be "at the disposition
of the territorial authorities," they remained under the effective control
of military authorities.9 The military authorities were only permitted to
delegate their authority to the territorial authorities under "exceptional"
circumstances. 0 The territorial police, in contrast, were a part of the local
4. Interview with Professor Vunduawe te Pemako, in Kinshasa (Aug. 1989).
5. ZAYi: A COUNTRY STUDY 269 (I. Kaplan ed., 1979) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY].
6. The Force Public was rebaptized the Armte Nationale Congolaise soon after independence,
and was subsequently renamed the Force Armke Zairoise (FAZ).
7. C. YOUNG, POLITICS IN THE CONGO 462 (1965).
8. Id. at 442.
9. Ordinance 081/130, Mesures administratives collectives; Mission de Police de la Force
Publique, art. 1 (Mar. 14, 1958).
10. Id.
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population, recruited locally by the territorial authorities to fulfill the
routine functions of maintaining order." They were poorly armed, but
they more reliably complied with local administrators' orders. At inde-
pendence, there were approximately twice as many territorial police as
Gendarmes. 2
The command structure of the Force Publique was entirely Belgian
throughout the colonial period. The territorial police as well as the
Gendarmes were commanded and trained by Belgian officers until inde-
pendence. While the soldiers of the regular forces rebelled against their
Belgian officers soon after independence, the rebellion did not extend to
the Gendarmes. Nevertheless, practically all of the experienced Belgian
officers departed soon after independence. UN personnel and Nigerian
police detachments attempted to fill some of the gaps in the army. Some
Belgians returned later, and the United States offered assistance.
In the turmoil that followed independence, the number of provinces
increased. With it, provincial leaders increased the number of policemen
and police bureaucracies. Young finds that: "Provincial leaders were quick
to appreciate the political importance of having an armed force at their
disposition."' Massive recruitment of new police units were carried out
during the early independence period.
When President Mobutu took control in 1965, one of his top priorities
was to gain control of the police and military apparatus. He first reduced
the number of provinces, eliminating bureaucratic duplication. In 1966,
he nationalized the police forces and placed the new National Police
within the Interior Ministry. The number of policemen was set at 20,000
in 1970. Their purpose was to perform all general police functions,
including "prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension and
prosecution of offenders, the maintenance of public order and the pro-
tection of citizens and property.' '1 4 While they were commanded by an
Inspector General (the equivalent of a Brigadier General under Zairian
law), local units remained responsible to regional authorities.
In 1972, President Mobutu eliminated local authority and accounta-
bility entirely and created the basic structure which is still in place. At
that time, he created the Gendarmerie Nationale which took away civilian
11. See Ordinance, Des Grades - Des Formes de l'Engagement, art. 1 (Aug. 13, 1956).
12. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 5, at 270. Six thousand territorial police as opposed to 3,000
gendarmes.
13. YouNo, supra note 7, at 465.
14. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 5, at 271.
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control and brought the police back into the national military. 5 One
major result of the changes was to deprive local leaders of control over
police. Where previously the political leader at the village or town level
could order the police to act directly, he now had to send a request to
the local commander, who did not always respond promptly, if at all.' 6
Disgruntled political leaders then turned to other security forces, such as
CADER, the security force of the MPR youth wing. 7 The Gendarmerie
Nationale remains the premier national police force. However, within the
Gendarmerie, special attention has been given to units like the special
investigative arm, the Brigade Sptciale de Recherches et de Surveillance
(BSRS).
In 1984, President Mobutu created a new force, the Garde Civile,
intended as an elite security force to patrol borders and control smuggling.
One reason given for forming the Garde Civile was to replace the
Gendarmerie which had gained a reputation for corruption and incom-
petence. Another reason was the German government's willingness to
provide money for training and equipping a new force." But though it
began life as an elite unit, it developed into a parallel police force and
quickly gained a reputation for violence and venality equalling that of the
Gendarmerie.
In August 1989, citing the Garde's excesses against the population,
the Central Committee of the MPR sought to limit the powers of the
chief of the Garde Civile, Kpama Baramoto, over the Kinshasa garrison.' 9
By 1990, however, Baramoto remained in control and, in fact, had even
obtained some control over military intelligence.
In terms of their current jurisdiction, the Garde Civile is hardly
distinguishable from the Gendarmes. In fact, even the Zairian government
stopped trying to distinguish the roles of the two forces. At the time of
his visit to Kinshasa in 1990, the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Kooijmans,
was informed that the Garde Civile has a mandate to "assist the Gen-
darmerie in carrying out its general mandate for the control of law and
15. Decree Law 72-031 (July 31, 1972) and Decree Law 72-041 (Aug. 30, 1972).
16. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 5, at 272.
17. Id.
18. The Garde Civile was initially trained and equipped by West Germany which, according
to Colin Legum's report, provided a team of trainers drawn from its special anti-terrorism unit.
COLIN LEOUM, AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD: 1985-1986 (1987). After the Germans stopped
financing the training, it was undertaken by Egypt.
19. Interview with Kamanda wa Kamanda, then deputy secretary of the MPR, in Kinshasa
(Aug. 1989).
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order within the country." 20 As he points out, however, the head of the
Garde Civile, like the heads of the other security forces, reports directly
to the President and there is no "hierarchical" link to the Gendarmerie.
The Specialized Services: SNIP and SARM
The other principal arm of the security apparatus is composed of
political intelligence forces, primarily the Service National d'Intelligence
et de Protection (SNIP) and Service d'Action et de Renseignements
Militaires (SARM). While little else about them has changed, the special-
ized services have had their names altered a number of times since 1960.
The SNIP, which is the premier civilian intelligence unit and is likely
to be the most powerful institution in the government, is a direct successor
to the colonial Sirett. Like the previous name changes, all of which were
intended to signal reform, its currently-benign name, SNIP, was adopted
in 1990 following the President's promise to give the security forces a
human face. Before its title took on the promise of "protection," it was
recognizable primarily for "documentation," first as the National Docu-
mentation Center (CND) and, after a brief interlude, as the National
Documentation Agency (AND). In recent years, there have been reports
of the existence of a special strike force within the intelligence unit, know
as the Force d'Intervention Spciale (FIS).
The legal duty of the civilian intelligence unit is to "ensure the internal
and external security of the state." Among the specific tasks which it
must undertake are collecting and interpreting information relevant to
state security and "investigation and determination of violations of state
security, and surveillance of people suspected of exercising activities of a
nature that may threaten the security of the state."'"
Under the Belgians, there were intelligence units attached to the army
and the territorial police. But, the Sarett was the elite force, established
to provide the colonial administration with political intelligence, and with
information on immigration and movement inside the country. It was
composed of a small permanent staff of eighty-one European agents and
20. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report
of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, to Zaire, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1989/33, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 10 (a), § 14, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
17/Add.1, (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF KooumNsJ.
21. Ordonnance n. 86-161 du 31 mai 1986 portant modification de l'Ordonnance n. 85-189 du
25 juillet 1985 fixant les attributions et I'Organisation de l'Agence Nationale de Documentation, Art.
1.
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an "enormous web of informers." 22 Soon after independence information
gathered by the Sarett surfaced throughout the country, confirming fears
that the SOretk was nearly omnipresent.
Prime Minister Lumumba never succeeded in asserting control over
the Saretk. In 1961, President Joseph Kasavubu appointed Victor Nen-
daka, an ally of Mobutu and a staunch anti-Lumumbist, to head the
agency. Nendaka succeeded in establishing the Saretk as an independent
power base under Mobutu. In 1961, when the Lumumbist Minister of
Interior, Christophe Gbenye, sought to dismiss Nendaka, Nendaka turned
to Mobutu, who immediately dispatched para-commandos to surround
the offices of the Interior Ministry and the Saretk.23
Two laws expanded the power and independence of the Siretk during
the 1960s. In 1961, the government issued Decret-loi 1/61, authorizing
broad administrative measures against suspected dissidents and explicitly
authorizing the SOrett to carry out these measures. 24 In 1969, President
Mobutu expanded its authority further, by granting it administrative and
financial autonomy. Under the 1969 law, budgetary matters are within
the exclusive domain of the head of the intelligence unit, who is appointed
by the President and responsible exclusively to him. Y
In his position as head of the SOrett, Victor Nendaka set a pattern
for future leaders of security forces. He was a close advisor to President
Mobutu and, although he moved on to a number of other cabinet
positions, he retained a base of authority in the security forces. Later,
beginning in 1969, the Saretk was headed by Mokolo wa Mpombo, another
close advisor to the President, particularly in foreign affairs matters. 26
The expansive powers exercised by the Saretk were subject to frequent
international criticism and (forcibly) subdued domestic attacks. President
22. Young, supra note 7, at 465. According to Professor Young, documents that emerged
from security files or were based on security files left behind by the Europeans demonstrate "the
extensiveness of the informer network, the penetration of organizations under their surveillance, and
the Sllret 's access to bank records." Id.
23. Id. at 468-469.
24. It is this law which continues to "hover" over the conduct of the security forces. Although
no longer relied upon explicitly, it appears to be the basis of legal arguments that the security forces
have special authority that exceeds the limits of the criminal code. See discussion, infra at note 53.
25. Ordonnance-loi No. 69-037 du 9 ao0t 1969 remplagant la Silret6 Nationale par le "Centre
National de Documentation" et attribuant l'autonomie administrative et financiere A cette institution.
26. Mokolo's MPR biography reports that he made 150 foreign trips on behalf of the President
in 8 years. MABI MULUMBA & MUTAMBA MAKOMBO, CADRES ET DIRIGEANTS AU ZAIRE; QuI sONT-ILS?
315 (1986). In 1990, when President Mobutu was compelled to institute some political reform, he
turned to Mokolo to organize the "popular consultation", described supra at note 1.
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Mobutu responded with cosmetic changes. In 1969, the President initiated
the first of several such changes intended to give the impression that he
was reforming the Saret . At that time, the name was changed to the
"Centre Nationale de Documentation" (CND). Later, when the CND's
leader, Mokolo, came into conflict with the President's security advisor,
Seti Yale, President Mobutu settled both scores in a familiar manner. In
February 1980, he arrested Mokolo and announced that he was dissolving
the CND. 27 He then immediately recreated it under two new names: Centre
National de Recherche et Information (CNRI) and the Service Nationale
d'Intelligence (SNI). Mokolo was appointed ambassador to France. Two
years later, in November 1982, the CNRI and SNI were reintegrated into
the newly formed AND and Mokolo returned to Kinshasa as its director.
Mokolo was replaced as Administrator General by Ngbanda Nzambo-
ko-Atumba, who served until the end of April 1990. He was then replaced
by General Likulia Bolongo, an army general and law professor, as part
of the 1990 "reforms" intended to bring a "human face" to the security
apparatus.
Side by side with the civilian intelligence unit, Zaire has maintained a
military intelligence unit. There are many similarities between the two
units, both in their function and in their recent history. The mandate of
the military unit extends to foreign and domestic threats. The legal mission
of the unit is to "obtain and use any information concerning military
security, destroy any cell of sabotage or subversion, prevent any danger
threatening the territorial integrity, counteract and reduce any potential
action of an enemy or his ally, in the inside or outside the national
border." It is placed under the authority of the President as "Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces."
The military intelligence unit was established as a separate force in
June 1985 when the Service de Renseignements Militaires et d'Action
(SRMA) was created. Before that time, the military security was operated
from inside the military and was generally known as "G2" at the national
level, "T2" at the level of provincial commands, and "S2" at the local
level.28
27. The change was announced April 15, 1980. This coincided with a "reform" of the justice
ministry, in which the minister, Kengo wa Dondo, one of the two other "White Ngwandi" was
removed from office and named ambassador to Belgium. Kengo had earned a reputation for frequent
intervention and manipulation of the justice system, first as Procureur de la Republic and then as
Justice Minister.
28. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUMMARY OF CONCERNS IN THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE (Jan. 30,
1987).
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Like the Surett, the military unit has undergone numerous cosmetic
changes intended to suggest deeper transformations. In 1986, the President
announced that he was dissolving SRMA. The announcement followed a
purported government investigation into the arbitrary detentions and
extrajudicial executions reported by Amnesty International. The President
confirmed that some abuses reported-by Amnesty had occurred, but he
refused to give any details. 29 Strangely, as Amnesty noted at the time, the
abuses to which the President referred actually occurred before SRMA
was even formed. 0
In any event, one month later, on November 6, 1986, SRMA was
reconstituted under an almost identical name, the Service d'Action et de
Renseignements Militaires (SARM).3 General Mahele Lieko Bokungu, was
appointed Commander at that time and retained the position until 1990,
when he was appointed to lead the Zairian forces in their support of the
government of President Habyarimana in neighboring Rwanda. At that
time, Kpama Baramoto was reportedly named to replace him as interim
head of SARM.3 2
Function and Conduct
The security forces perform a variety of roles in the political and
economic life of the country. Some are explicitly political. The security
forces have been used to enforce the policy of the ruling party, the MPR,
whether or not such policies were actually enacted as law. Others are only
indirectly political. They act at the behest of those with economic or
political power to extract payments and mete out summary justice. Where,
as in Zaire, economic and political power are centralized in the same
individuals, the beneficiaries are the same. Finally, the security forces
engage in nearly random acts, which are intended exclusively to extract
money.
In their various roles, the security forces have used tactics that violate
the basic rights of citizens guaranteed not only by international treaties
which Zaire has ratified, but by Zairian law as well. The abuses of the
security forces, including arbitrary arrest and detention, physical abuse,
29. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ZAIRE: REPORTS OF TORTURE AND KILLINGS COMMITTED BY THE
ARMED FORCES IN SHABA REGION (Mar. 1986).
30. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 28.
31. Ordinance 86-278 (Nov. 6, 1986).
32. According to reports from Kinshasa, Mahele was injured while leading the forces in
Rwanda.
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torture and kidnapping, are documented in frequent reports by interna-
tional human rights organizations. 3 They are, as frequently, dismissed by
the government of Zaire as "incidental mishaps," or "bavures," literally
"stains" on an otherwise clean slate.
The Political Role of the Security Forces
Each of the security forces has played an active role in suppressing
political opposition and enforcing rigid party ideology. Frequently they
act in concert, in actions planned in the National Security Council, or in
the Regional Security Councils overseen by the regional governors. At
other times, they appear to act independently, or even to compete with
each other.
Security forces have suppressed public demonstrations, arrested and
detained opposition members, harassed the families and friends of their
opposition and suppressed information by arresting journalists and ha-
rassing others. A number of Zairians were arrested and detained in the
summer of 1989 for meeting with the Lawyers Committee delegation in
Kinshasa on a government approved visit for the Lawyers Committee.
The delegation itself was attacked in a suspicious incident involving
security forces during a subsequent visit in March 1990.14
The Sarett and its successors have played the most extensive role in
overseeing political activity and ensuring against opposition. In practice,
the civilian intelligence service closely monitors the political and social
activities of all sectors of society, including those in positions of political
and party authority. As Professor Young wrote of the Sretk, it can
exercise substantial leverage over people in power with information "on
matters such as Swiss bank accounts and the dubious financial transactions
of certain political figures."
The activities of the civilian intelligence have been a source of partic-
ular tension between the security police and other arms of state power."
33. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LA RPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE: EN MAROE DE LA LO1, LES
FORCES DE StCURITt RtPRMENT LES OPPOSANTS AU GOUVERNEM1NT (1988-1990) Index AL: AFR 62/10/
90 (Sept. 1990), and LAWYERS COmMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, ZAIRE: REPRESSION AS POLICY (1990)
[hereinafter REPRESSION AS POLICY]. For reports of human rights abuses since 1990, see, especially,
the reports of the Ligue Zairoise des droits de I'homme.
34. See, REPRESSION AS POLICY, supra note 33.
35. Professor Michael Schatzberg makes this point in connection with the CND surveillance
of state-party officials in the territorial administration. M. Schatzberg, The Long Arm of the Law:
Insecurity, Instability, and the Political Police in Zaire, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association (Mar. 24-27, 1982).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1990
The CND filed regular reports on the activities of all members of the
National Legislative Council during recess.3 6 And, as Nguza Karl-I-Bond
testified before the U.S. Congress, instead of monitoring the threat of
foreign incursions, security forces monitor the private affairs of people
in government. They know, he said, "exactly what time I left my house
or what time I came back." '37 For their surveillance activities, the intelli-
gence service has an effective network of informers throughout the society
who are, most likely, paid occasionally for providing information relating
to security matters .38
The civilian and military intelligence units have jealously guarded their
autonomy, even in the face of rare criticism from political authorities. In
1981, the Central Committee criticized the intelligence units for acting on
their own and for failing to report information to political officials. The
Central Committee ordered the intelligence service to comply with its
official mandate, to coordinate its actions with the National Security
Council and to report regularly to the political authorities within the MPR
hierarchy.3 9 None of the specific instructions contained in the directive
were incorporated into practice.
Perhaps because of their independence and their reputation for effi-
ciency, intelligence officials have come to fill a number of other functions
in the state in addition to seeking out potential opposition. They oversee
the work of local party officials and, in the words of Professor Schatzberg,
they play the role of a "silent ombudsman," verifying the complaints of
citizens and conveying them to higher officials. This is perhaps most
surprising, in light of the fear that the intelligence service inspires in the
population. But as Professor Schatzberg points out, the civilian intelligence
unit is the quickest conduit of detailed information to the Central Gov-
ernment. Reports of the CND, according to Professor Schatzberg who
saw a number of them early in the 1970s, were "far more detailed and
probing than reports filed by other arms of the state-party.'"'4
36. Id.
37. HousE COMM. ON FOREION AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SITUATION IN ZAIRE: FALL 1981; TESTIMONY OF NouzA KARL-I-BoND, H.R. Doc. No. 381-16, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1981).
38. Schatzberg, supra note 35, at 15.
39. Directives au Conseil Ex6cutif relatives A la Dcision d'6tat no. 05/CC/81 en mati6re
Politique administrative et judiciaire.
40. Schatzberg, supra note 35, at 15. The capacities of the civilian security force may be
somewhat overrated; or perhaps they have declined since the time of Professor Schatzberg's research.
The author had occasion to hear and read accounts of the AND regarding his visit to Zaire for the
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For reasons that are less clear, foreign policy is often delegated to the
intelligence service. In interviews with diplomats in Kinshasa during March
1990, the author was told that the most important foreign affairs decisions
came out of the office of the President's security advisor, Nkema Liloo,
or out of the AND. The same has been true since the late 1970s when
these roles were filled by Seti Yale and Mokolo Mpombo. Although there
is no inherent reason why intelligence heads would play a role in foreign
relations, it is consistent with their position as a shadow government.
Their fierce loyalty to the President has earned them a say in all areas
of the President's rule.
The role of the intelligence service extends beyond surveillance and
advice to action as well, whenever necessary. As discussed below, AND
agents have legal police authority to arrest and detain. They also benefit
historically from privileges which effectively permit them to detain indef-
initely on their own authority. Dissidents have also reported that a special
strike force, known as the Force d'Intervention Sp~ciale, has broken up
political gatherings and abused those in attendance. In this connection,
the military intelligence unit, SARM, has frequently played the same role.
In fact, it is hardly distinguishable from the AND with respect to sup-
pression of domestic dissent.
Politics and Profit in Security Force Practice
Many of the abuses of the security forces are not aimed entirely at
political repression. Robert Remole, a former State Department official
and political officer in Kinshasa, testified to Congress that the income of
a soldier would allow the soldier and family to eat a staple diet of manioc
or rice, and nothing else. After paying for the food, no money would
remain for clothes, rent, or school expenses. "What does he do? He
steals." The same is true of all the armed civil servants. 4'
Low paid security officials are said to earn as much as 90% of their
income from sources other than their official salary. Extortion and theft
Lawyers Committee. Although the AND confidently reported considerable detail - including comments
made at meetings, the address where meetings occurred and the number of people attending - many
of these details were simply wrong, though neither more or less damning. In some cases, it appeared
that those people following the Lawyers Committee delegation lost track of us and then fabricated
events in order to save face. In other cases, it appears that the AND received sketchy second hand
accounts of meetings.
41. The noted exception is the President's special guard, the DSP, which is reported to be the
best paid force. According to AmuCA CONFIDENTIAL, however, at times in 1991 even the DSP, for
example, had to find its salary on the streets.
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take many forms. Often they are ancillary to political repression. On
March 15, 1990, for example, the homes of a half-dozen opposition
leaders in Kinshasa were ransacked by security forces, reportedly belonging
to a unit of the AND. 42 One of those attacked, Lusanga Ngiele, described
the event in a letter to General Singa Mosambayi, minister in charge of
territorial security:
Twelve men, armed with revolvers and weapons of war, masked in
military helmets, and dressed half in uniform, half in civilian clothes,
surrounded my house with their vehicles. While four of the men
remained in the cars, the rest climbed over my fence .... Two men
pointed revolvers at us while the others moved our belongings to the
cars.
They took everything: the hi-fi, suitcases filled with clothes, my wife's
jewelry and everything but my pajamas, my briefcases with personal
documents, money and a round-trip airplane ticket, Lubumbashi-
Kinshasa; a sewing machine, a cassette recorder and video player, not
to mention half a sack of dried and salted fish (which only shows
their own need); a large portion of my children's clothes and even
their school uniforms.
They destroyed the rest: A large Sony television set which weighed
too much for them, they smashed with an iron bar; all the dishes
broken, the living room furniture shredded with bayonets, armoires
and cabinets smashed and tossed up-side down, all the vehicles on the
property broken, etc. In brief, an act of indescribable savagery.43
In a large proportion of the overtly political arrests investigated by
the Lawyers Committee, security forces took belongings, stole personal
jewelry, or ransacked homes and businesses. While perhaps not the
primary goal of the arrest, their conduct contributed to reducing the
capacities of the opposition, while at the same time compensating under-
paid security agents.
The theft that accompanies their maneuvers also serves to support
government claims that those who take part are not acting in an official
capacity or are not even security agents. The government has frequently
suggested that the perpetrators were only "bandits," imitating agents of
the state. As a final defense, the government officials fall back on the
argument that such actions were merely "bavures," and not government
policy.
42. The unit of the AND, known as the Special Intervention Force (FIS), appears frequently
in accounts of suppressed opposition activities. The attack of March 15, 1991 involved the households
of Leon Kadima, Lusanga-Ngiele (Franqois), Kanana Thiongo, Me Kadima Kalalo, Kazadi-Membu,
and Malamba-Kassanda.
43. Letter from Lusanga Ngiele to General Mosambayi (Mar. 15, 1990).
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In a more routine fashion, security forces are used to collect taxes
and ensure compliance with government policies. The taxes themselves are
frequently illegal impositions of local party officials. The methods em-
ployed to collect them ensure that the agents themselves are compensated
at the same time.
Professor Thomas Callaghy described the methods used by the security
forces as an "encirclement and dragnet manoeuver" called a ratissage. In
this case, the ratissage occurred in 1973. The Gendarmerie participated
together with the predecessor to the AND and the security wing of the
MPR youth movement. At about 6:00 a.m. troops "moved systematically
from house to house, street to street from one locale to another demanding
people to 'present their identification cards in order to see if they had
paid their taxes and fulfilled other requirements'."
The localities were shut down for the day while Gendarmes collected
about 2,800 Zaires for the purchase of new ID cards and payment of
taxes in three villages. Forty-two people were arrested. From the official
point of view the ratissage was entirely successful. The local residents,
however, claimed that Gendarmes committed robberies, rapes and other
offenses against the population. The money extracted for supposedly
unpaid taxes, they claimed, was pocketed by local administrators and
distributed among the Gendarmes and soldiers who participated in the
operation. 41
Similar stories are extremely frequent on a smaller scale. One Kinshasa
businessman told the author that AND agents showed up at his small
store to collect, when he failed to pay purported income taxes. In another
case, a customs inspector named Solomobo Mokamo was fired on sus-
picion of embezzling funds in June 1989. Rather than referring his case
to the courts, he was reported to the AND, which took summary action,
although there was no question of national security. The AND arrested
and detained him in July 1989 and he died in AND custody one month
later, reportedly from internal injuries suffered at their hands.4
Security forces also act as agents of private justice enforcing a civil
debt or personal vendetta. The U.S. State Department, in its Human
Rights Report for 1989, noted a number of such cases .47 One small
44. T. CALLAGHY, THE STATE-SOCIETY STRUGGLE: ZAIRE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 287
(1983).
45. Id. at 289.
46. REPRESSION AS POLICY, supra note 33.
47. The report stated: "The civil guard arrested a number of local and foreign businessmen
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businessman in Kinshasa reported to the Lawyers Committee that, during
1986, he suffered severe business losses and was unable to pay creditors.
Over a period of six months, he was arrested more than a half dozen
times at his home late at night. Each arrest ended quickly after he
negotiated and paid a bribe to the arresting agents. Many other such cases
arose out of contract violations and debtor default. According to busi-
nessmen, it is standard practice to denounce the defaulting party to a
security agent. The businessman accompanies the denunciation with a
negotiated fee for the arrest.
A number of cases involve so-called "barons" of the regime using
the security forces to enforce personal or business interests. In one case,
a young woman named Kamunga Mwimpe, a student of architecture in
Kinshasa, disappeared on June 23, 1988. The woman was suspected of
having an affair with a former general director of the state electricity
company (SNEL) who was the husband of a high ranking member of the
Central Committee. After she disappeared, security agents told the family
that they had kidnapped the young woman at the behest of the wife,
Mayuma Kala. The family approached every competent state organ to
intervene. They next turned to their priest and eventually told their story
at an Amnesty International news conference in Kinshasa in November
1989. Nevertheless, the government never responded.4
Another recent case involving a clash of "barons" led to the arrest
of a young commercial lawyer and two others in Goma, in the Northern
Kivu region. Me Haguma Nkuba represented a powerful local businessman
who was involved in a conflict with Bemba Saolona, a close collaborator
of the President and perhaps the most powerful businessman in Zaire. 49
Bemba reportedly dispatched a lieutenant from Kinshasa to stop Me
Haguma's client from proceeding. When he failed, he arrested Haguma
and two others, placed them on a chartered jet belonging to Bemba's
company and flew them to Beni, north of Goma. The three men were
held in Beni from April 27 to May 2 and then released. When Haguma
on false charges or for questionable, albeit common, Zairian business practices. They were held in
detention until bribes were paid." U.S. DEP'T ST, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS FOR 1989
415, Doc. H382-2 (1990) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS).
48. Amnesty International interviews with the family of Kamunga Mwimpe, in Kinshasa (Aug.
1989 and Mar. 1990), and in London (Dec. 1989).
49. Bemba, the remaining "white Ngwandi", see supra note 3, has known business interests
in "almost" every sector of the economy. Among these are the best known commercial names in
Zaire.
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returned to Goma, he was arrested again and held for a month before
he was released and the spurious charges were dropped.
The most common practice by far, however, involves simple extortion
with only the thinnest veneer of legitimacy. Identification cards and car
permits, for example, are a frequent source of income for Gendarmes.
Zairians are required to carry official identity cards at all times. The
cards, first distributed in 1973, must be purchased. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s, there were frequent reports that Gendarmes established
impromptu roadblocks to check ID cards and assess fines against those
who had no cards. A clergyman in Goma described the response in his
community:
We trained people in an intense campaign to carry their ID cards,
because the Gendarmes would use the absence of cards as an excuse
to extract money and arrest citizens. Then the Gendarmes started
taking IDs from people who had them and ripping them up. So people
left their ID cards at home. They felt it would be better to just pay
a fine than to lose their ID card and have to pay a fine.50
In the mid-1980s, the practice became less frequent. Now, according
to the Goma clergyman, the practice has been revived. The story is
repeated in different forms throughout the country, depending on the
region. In the cities, cab drivers face constant road blocks and spot fines
for "infractions" that range from having insufficient air in the tires to
not painting their cab the correct shade of yellow. In the villages, women
pay in-kind tolls as they pass the Gendarmerie with produce picked in
the field.
In Kinshasa, an entire vocabulary of extortion has developed, centering
on food and drink. The armed officer may begin negotiation simply by
asking, "Na kolio yo - Will I eat you?" (Meaning, "What will I eat if
you give me nothing?") The lucky negotiator may get off with beer
money, "Madesu ya bana - beans for the children," or "Lipa ya bana
- bread for the children." The unlucky ones lose their identity cards,
necessary permits or authorizations or end up in a prison cell.
Part II Judicial Recourse and Control over Security Forces
The problem posed by the security forces is not primarily one of laws,
but of enforcement. There are laws whose ambiguity is used to protect
50. Interview with Goma pastor, in North Kivu (Mar. 1990). See REPRESSION AS POLICY, supra
note 33.
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security force members from criticism. But this is not the primary imped-
iment to security force accountability. Rather, it could be said that despite
the law and despite periodic efforts to subject the security forces to
judicial accountability, the security forces continue to exercise practical
authority over judicial and political organs. The evidence for this lies in
the many instances where an apparently sincere desire to prosecute security
force abuses has ended without result. In addition to this, there are the
nearly constant pronouncements of reforms intended to bring about
accountability. Some of these reform efforts appear sincere, although they
never reach the level of the Presidency or the security forces themselves.
Finally, judicial officials acknowledge that, notwithstanding any laws in
place, the judicial apparatus is incapable of standing up to security force
abuses.
The legal authority of the security forces is, itself, not entirely clear.
Until recently, it was generally believed that the security forces were
entitled to detain indefinitely and were not subject to civilian prosecution.
In international forums, however, Zaire has recently claimed that, without
exception, the security forces were bound to follow the rules of criminal
procedure. In particular instances, however, Zairian authorities have relied
on uncited special authority possessed by the security forces which exceeds
the limits imposed by the code of criminal procedure.
The most contested legal issue concerns the authority of security forces
to arrest and detain. Under the code of criminal procedure, these are
judicial functions, carried out by officers of the judicial police (OPJs).
Most security agents are OPJs, and that is part of the confusion.
Zairian law requires that anyone arrested be brought immediately
before the Minist&e Publique (prosecutorial office of the magistracy).
The arresting officer has up to forty-eight hours under exceptional cir-
cumstances." A suspect may be detained for investigation, but only if
this is ordered by a magistrate within five days of his arrest. Detention
orders must be renewed every fifteen days. In Zaire's first report to the
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations pursuant to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this was the only pro-
cedure mentioned.
51. Ordinance 78-289, art. 73 (July 3, 1978). In response to questions raised by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, after presentation of its initial report under Article 40 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Professor Lwamba-Katansi stated that
arrested persons must be brought before the Minist6re Publique within 24 hours. U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 30th Sess., 738th mtg., 17 at 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.738 (1987).
CONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE
There is another law on the books with far fewer restrictions. Decree
Number 1 of 1961 permits security forces wide latitude to search, restrict
and detain anyone who "by his activities threatens state security.''52 Until
at least 1981, the government claimed that Decree Number 1 permitted
the intelligence forces, though not the regular police, to detain suspects
as long as necessary. But Decree Number 1 is subject to various limitations
which have never been fully implemented.5" In 1981, the Central Com-
mittee of the MPR - the constitutional "guarantor of Mobutism" and
the highest organ besides the Presidency - criticized the security forces
for this as well as for their general lack of accountability. The Central
Committee called on the security forces to put the provisions of Decree
Number I into effect, particularly in connection with house searches and
detentions. 4
More recently, the government and the security forces abandoned their
reliance on Decree No. 1, but continued to claim that the civilian and
military intelligence were permitted to detain indefinitely. After a visit to
Zaire in 1987, Amnesty International determined that the AND and SARM
"retained powers to detain prisoners incommunicado without charge or
trial for as long as they considered necessary."" But despite its efforts,
Amnesty was unable to determine the legal basis for the authority.
Finally, perhaps in response to the persistent inquiries of Amnesty
International and other international observers, government officials aban-
doned the claim of extraordinary security force authority. After 1987,
they began to tell questioners that all police and security forces were
52. Decree 1/61 (Feb. 25, 1961) relatif aux mesures de s~reti de I'tat. Droit de perquisition,
d'internement et de mise sous surveillance.
53. The administrative restrictions can only be applied upon the written order of the State
Commissioner for Territorial Security, or his designee. The AND Administrator General is a permanent
designee under the law. For purposes of "preliminary investigation", a ministerial regulation permits
a security agent to detain a suspect for up to five days before obtaining the written order. However,
the agent must provide a procks verbale, in a form that is referred to in the regulation but not
included.
The Decree also requires the institution of an "Oversight Commission" in the office of the
First State Commissioner. The Oversight Commission is to be composed of two magistrates and one
employee of "Suret6", under conditions specified by the Decree. Immediately upon instituting the
administrative restrictions, the State Commissioner or his delegate must submit all relevant documents
to the Commission. The Commission reviews the information and submits an opinion to the First
State Commissioner within one month. The First State Commissioner then issues a final order within
8 days. The order may be reviewed by the First State Commission at any time. But, in any event,
it must be reviewed after six months. The Oversight Commission was apparently never established.
54. Directives au Conseil Excutif relatives A la D6cision d'Etat no 05.CC.81 en mati~re
Politique administrative et judiciaire (June 8, 1981).
55. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 84 (1988).
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bound by the single standard of the Criminal Code, including the forty-
eight hour and five-day limits on arrest and detention.16
Nevertheless, the ambiguity is not entirely resolved. In certain in-
stances, government officials continue to assert the extraordinary authority
of security forces. For example, in August 1989, security forces arrested
and detained four Zairians in connection with the author's visit to Zaire
on behalf of the Lawyers Committee. All four were arrested and detained
in flagrant violation of the Criminal Code. One of the four was held for
two months. Nevertheless, government officials told the Lawyers Com-
mittee that the men were detained and questioned in accordance with the
provisions governing the authority of the security forces.
Practically, it matters little whether or not the security forces are
violating the law, since there exists no means of sanctioning the violation.
But, in addition, the distinction between political ideology and law was
obscured by the 1974 merger of the MPR and the State. One well-known
example is the wearing of ties which was functionally prohibited and
frequently punished, but never made "illegal." As agents of the State
directly dependent on the President, the security forces were charged with
enforcing the goals of the Party-State. So, at least until 1990, it made
little difference whether security forces were acting according to party
doctrine or law.
Finally, agents of the AND and other special forces have a special,
extra-legal status, which allows the head of the force to prevent any
investigation or prosecution for improprieties. Article I of the 1969 law
governing the status of intelligence force officials (then known as "CND")
56. The UN special rapporteur, M. Kooijmans reported: "It was explicitly stated to the Special
Rapporteur that each and every agency is bound in exactly the same way by the legal provisions
regarding arrest and detentions of persons." REPORT OF KooUMANs, supra note 20, at 5.
As to his specific inquiry whether administrative detention was practiced, the Special Rapporteur
reported:
From the various replies received, it became clear that there used to be a legal basis in
Ddcret-loi No. 1/61 of 25 February 1961 and that it was regularly applied during the
period of civil strife between 1960 and 1965, together with other administrative measures
such as internal banishment and house-arrest, but that this legal instrument was
considered to be obsolete. On the other hand, the Commissaire d'Etat for Territorial
Security told the Special Rapporteur that administrative measures, including detention
and internal banishment, were sometimes taken on his own authority. These measures
were of a temporary nature and the President of the Judicial Council had to be
informed. It did not become clear, however, what was the legal basis for this authority
other than Dcret loi No. 1/1961.
REPORT OF KOOUMANS, supra note 20, at 7.
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states that police officers or officials of the public prosecutor must "seek
the obligatory advice of the Director General" before they can arrest, or
even question an agent for an act committed in the course of his duty."
The law creates a strict hierarchy within the agency, according to which
agents report to the Director General, who has the status of a cabinet
official. He, in turn, determines whether to forward the reports of agents
on to other government departments, including the public prosecutor.
The So-Called Reforms
Since at least 1978, the government of Zaire has announced reforms
purportedly intended make the security forces accountable to judicial and
political organs. One of the earliest so-called reforms was an effort to
subject all judicial police officers (OPJs), which includes most security
force officers, to effective judicial supervision.
The problem was partly historical and primarily practical. The colonial
legacy left Zaire with a network of statutory OPJs which survived into
independence. The 1973 Law of Territorial Administration, for example,
grants all principal regional authorities the status of OPJ.58 The same is
true of agents of the AND and its predecessor organs.59 As a result,
historically, the Ministtre Publique has been unable to sanction the
frequent abuses committed by the OPJs, who are under the administrative
hierarchy of other agencies and may, in fact, stand higher in the MPR
than the relevant procureur.60
In 1978 the government issued a regulation that gave the Justice
Ministry, 6' through the Ministkre Publique, the authority to discipline and
57. Ordinance 78-289, art. 44 (July 3, 1978). If the arrest is incident to an activity unconnected
with his AND function, the Director General must be "notified".
58. Loi No. 73/015 du 5 January 1973, Portant Organisation Territoriale et Administrative de
la Republique. Under the law, only the lowest regional authority, the chef de localitt is not an OPJ.
The Chef de CollectivitM, Commissaire de Zone, and Commissaire Sous-Rfgionaux as well as their
assistants are all OPJs.
59. See, e.g., Ordonnance-loi 69-038 du 9 Aoflt 1969 relatif au statut judiciaire des Agents et
Fonctionnaires du Centre National de Documentation, Art. 3.
60. In the Report which accompanies the Regulation of 3 July 1978, the drafters explain that
the OPJs are supposed to be the "eye and arm" of the Ministdre Public and yet the Minist6re Public
had no direct authority over them. According to the Report: "This explains the number of abuses
... before which the Minist6re Public is, all too often, impotent for lack of effective constraints on
these auxiliaries of the court."
61. The Justice Ministry in Zaire is known as the "Judicial Council." In this article, the
president is referred to as the "minister" and the Judicial Council as the "Justice Ministry" although,
in fact, the Zairian institutions are somewhat different than might be implied by the titles. Under
the first MPR constitution, President Mobutu "presided" over the Judicial Council as he did all
other organs of the party-state. Later modifications provided for a separate president of the Judicial
Council, who could still exercise direct authority over the affairs of courts as well as prosecutors.
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suspend all OPJs. 62 The regulation requires that all OPJs swear an oath
of allegiance to the law and be accountable to the Ministbre Publique. It
also regulates their conduct with respect to arrests, detentions and inves-
tigations.
The intent of the regulation was, however, never realized. By 1990,
the Justice Minister had still not succeeded in asserting authority over the
OPJs, particularly those attached to the security forces. Security force
agents simply refused to take the required oath. A prominent lawyer in
Bukavu explained this problem:
In law, every OPJ's authority is dependent on the prosecutor of his
region. In theory, the prosecutor can summon any OPJ, even those
in the military. But although a prosecutor can open a dossier on an
OPJ, he cannot, in practice, sanction them. In my experience, I do
not know of a single OPJ who has ever been sanctioned for the abuse
of power.63
In addition, for reasons that are not entirely clear, civilian courts have
no jurisdiction over OPJs who commit criminal offenses. 64 The Bukavu
lawyer, who is a former member of the Central Committee, noted that
civilian magistrates have absolutely no control over OPJs. He said:
Infractions between OPJs and civilians go to the military tribunals for
adjudication. This should not be the case. These cases should go to
the civilian courts. We have been making this argument without
success.
65
Moreover, the lawyer added, "Whenever cases accusing them of illegal
conduct goes [sic] to the military tribunals, they always get off.'' 66
In February 1980, the President announced the formation of a Joint
Commission (Commission Mixte) to include representatives of the Justice
Department and the CND. It would review laws and regulations on
detention as well as individual cases. In addition, it was to be the sole
authority over the conduct of house searches.
62. Ordonnance No. 78-289 of 3 July 1978 relative A l'exercise des attributions d'officier et
agent de police judiciaire.
63. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with a lawyer, in Bukavu (Mar. 1990)
(name withheld upon request).
64. This is true despite a decision of the Central Committee in 1981 ordering civilian courts
to take jurisdiction over OPJs for "infractions committed in the exercise" of their duties. D~cisions
d'6tat No. 05/CC/81 en mati~re politique, administrative et judiciaire; 8 June 1981). Under Article
64 of the Constitution, the directive that followed the decision was binding on all relevant government
bodies.
65. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with a lawyer, in Bukavu (Mar. 1990).
66. Id.
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In December 1981, responding to criticism of arrest procedure by
Amnesty International, Seti Yale wrote:
I would like to reiterate the Head of State's well-known concern to
see the Joint Commission working as soon as possible, whose creation
he announced only a few months ago. Naturally, we are sorry to note
that this decision has not been implemented as rapidly as the Head of
State himself recommended.
The Commission may, at some point, have been formed, but it most
certainly did not do anything. In 1987, Zaire reported to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee that the Justice Ministry had instituted
a Joint Commission in 1984 to supervise and ensure the legality of
detentions. The Committee asked Zaire to provide details of the Com-
mission's work. Professor Lwamba-Katansi returned to the Committee
months later empty-handed. He explained that "the Commission had to
overcome certain practical difficulties in its work .... The numerous
journeys the Commission had to make created problems, mainly in respect
of transport." In many meetings with magistrates and lawyers in Zaire
held during 1989 and 1990 to discuss arrest and detention, no one ever
mentioned the existence of the Commission to the author.
In 1986, the focus of reform changed. Zaire established the Department
of Citizens Rights and Liberties (DCRL), a government organ mandated
to resolve human rights disputes by using the prescribed legal procedures
or through the cooperation of sister ministries. The DCRL was promoted
with great fanfare by the government of Zaire and President Mobutu. It
was established largely in response to reports of international bodies like
Amnesty International. As a result, it has come as no surprise that, despite
the fanfare, in three years of operation it has done little to address the
problems posed by the security forces, or even to solve a single human
rights abuse.
In his 1989 speech to the United Nations, President Mobutu said the
DCRL was "endowed with sweeping powers to accomplish its mission," 67
but this was hardly the case. The DCRL entered into "Joint-Action
Arrangements," with several security forces, including the Garde Civile,
the AND, and the Gendarmerie Nationale.68 Under the Arrangements, the
67. President Mobutu, Speech to the U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 4, 1989).
68. These signed arrangements are in the form of contracts and generally contain four sections.
Section I establishes periodic meetings at which, to varying degrees, depending on the Protocol,
representatives of the DCRL and the relevant security force: (i) review complaints against the security
service, (ii) evaluate arrests and detentions, and (iii) review measures taken by the service to improve
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DCRL was supposed to meet regularly with a representative of the security
force to review detentions and discuss human rights questions. In cases
of emergency, the DCRL theoretically had direct access to the detention
facility, alone or with an agent of the security force. 69 But even these
modest provisions were never fulfilled in practice. Meetings did not take
place as provided,70 and the DCRL did not make use of the emergency
provisions. This was demonstrated to the author when the four Zairians
were arrested during the visit to Kinshasa in August 1989. The DCRL
learned of the arrests on a Wednesday, four days after the fact. At that
time, no one knew where the men were being held or for what reason.
It turned out later that they had been arrested by the AND.
Although the second highest-ranking member of the DCRL knew of
the arrests, no immediate and direct action was taken to find the men.
Rather, the investigation was referred to the Department of Territorial
Security to commence on the following Monday. Even then, no news was
conveyed to the author or the families of the men until three of them
were released two weeks later.71
Beginning in 1986, the new Justice Minister announced his intention
to attack the problem of arbitrary arrest and detention. On highly pub-
licized visits to detention facilities, the minister, Nsinga Udjuu, released
detainees who were not held under legitimate detention orders.
However, even close associates in the Justice Ministry acknowledged
that such action had limited effect. One high ranking official stated:
We are instituting measures to deter the security forces from abusing
the population and holding people for long periods; now we require
them to obey the 48 hour period. We are getting some success in this
matter where common criminals are concerned; but when it comes to
its respect for human rights, including, in particular, sanctions taken against officers who have
violated the rights of citizens. Section 2 establishes procedures for investigating complaints against
the security forces. Sections 3 and 4 set the composition for Joint-Action Commissions and call for
cooperation to fulfill the wishes of the President of the Republic to have the rights of all citizens
restored.
69. According to the Arrangements, the Political Director of the DCRL has unconditional
access to the detention facilities of the Garde Civile and, with certain conditions, to those of the
gendarmerie nationale. Visits to the AND detention centers are permitted on prior notice.
70. The DCRL documentation available to the Lawyers Committee refers to only three meetings
of Joint-Action Commissions through June 1989. A total of 6 cases were brought to the attention
of the relevant security forces during those meetings.
71. DCRL Telex (Sept. 21, 1989). Lawyers Committee communications with the DCRL and
the office of Ambassador Mushobekwa (Oct. 2, 1989, Sept. 20, 1989 & Nov. 13, 1989).
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cases that concern state security or political matters, the security forces
have been unwilling to listen to the Justice Ministry.72
This appears to be borne out by the many stories told to the author where
security forces arrested people out of purely economic motives and then
threatened to accuse them of political violations if they did not cooperate."
In that way, we were told, they were insured that the Justice Ministry
could not intervene. Many lawyers in Kinshasa, however, questioned
whether the Justice Ministry's measures had any systemic effect on the
practice of arbitrary arrest, even in cases which were entirely non-political.
One final "reform" that is hardly worth mentioning occurred in 1989,
when President Mobutu established the Department of Territorial Security
with purported authority over four of the Security Forces (AND, SARM,
Garde Civile, and the Immigration Service (ANI)). The minister appointed
to head the Department was General Singa Mosambayi, a long-time
military collaborator of the President's.
The State Department Human Rights report notes the appointment of
General Singa, and states: "Late in 1989, this official took preliminary
steps toward implementing effective coordinating mechanisms which could
enhance the discipline of these forces." ' 74 In our interviews, we found
little confirmation of the State Department's tentative appraisal. Members
of government and the Central Committee were skeptical that the General
would succeed in coordinating the activities of the historically independent
forces. In any event, in an August 1989 interview, General Singa strongly
defended the conduct of the security forces and did not indicate the need
for any significant changes.75 In March 1991, the DCRL was incorporated
into the Department of Justice. Its former leader, however, continued to
play an active role in promoting Zaire's human rights record in his
position as the President's special Security Advisor.
The Third Republic
On April 24, 1990, after three months of "Popular Consultations,"
President Mobutu announced the end of the Second Republic and poten-
72. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Kaniki Unshengwo Ituome, in
Kinshasa (Aug. 1989).
73. One such example was recounted to us by Me. Kamanda wa Kamanda, who replaced
Nsinga as Justice Minister for a short time in 1990.
74. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413.
75. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with General Singa Boyembe Mosambayi,
in Kinshasa (Aug. 1989).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1990
tially far-reaching changes for a new "Third Republic" of Zaire. The
most significant change announced by the President was the end to the
MPR party-state, and the advent of a three-party system. In keeping with
this, the President announced the depoliticization of public services, the
armed forces and the security forces, the immediate dissolution of such
party organs as the Central Committee and Political Bureau and he gave
permission for multiple trade unions to form.
Although the President announced that he would take leave of the
MPR and the day-to-day affairs of the government, he retained control
over the security forces and the army. He also announced that, as
President, he would not be subject to oversight or control by the legislature
or the executive. He said of his role in the new system:
Every son and daughter of our country, whether or not a member of
a party must acknowledge him. And, whatever happens, as Chief
situated above the melee, he must seek to remain the common
denominator, that is to say the reassembler, the pacificator, the unifier.76
During the course of the Popular Consultation which preceded the
April 24th speech, the President toured the country attending public
meetings and reported receiving 6,128 memoranda.77 The population of
Zaire expressed itself with shocking forthrightness about the problems in
the country. In public meetings and in memoranda submitted to the
President, the people were especially critical of the MPR, government
corruption, abuse of human rights by the security forces and the absence
of the rule of law. An African diplomat in Kinshasa underscored the
open debate when he observed that "this is the first true public debate
ever held on Mobutu and his policies, and the results are devastating. '"78
As the President acknowledged in his April 24, 1990 speech and again
in his May 3, 1990 speech, reform of the security forces was widely
demanded during the Popular Consultations. 79 In his April 24 speech he
merely announced the depoliticization of the forces. In his speech of May
76. President Mobutu, Speech (Apr. 24, 1990) in LA SEMAINE, Apr. 25, 1990.
77. Id.
78. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with African Diplomat, in Kinshasa (Mar.
1990).
79. One of most widely circulated memoranda, submitted by employees of the Foreign Ministry,
attacked the composition of the security forces, noting that they composed primarily of agents who
originated from the region of Equateur, home of the President. According to the memorandum, the
head of each force was a member of the same ethnic group as President Mobutu. Only Citizen
Nkema, security advisor to the President was of a different ethnic group, but he too was from
Equateur.
CONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE
3, 1990, the President returned to the question of fundamental restruc-
turing: "Throughout the course of my tour through the eleven regions of
the country and in the multiple audiences which I accorded, people insisted
a great deal on the profound restructuring of the security services.'"'1 His
solution was to announce new appointments:
In response to this concern, and in view of giving these services a
more human face, I have just designated two eminent jurists to head,
respectively, the National Security Council and the AND. The process
of restructuring thus begun will be pursued progressively with the
revision of the laws organizing these services in order to guaranty the
full exercise of individual liberties.8 1
Thus far, the President appears to be duplicating earlier patterns of so-
called reform. The newly appointed security heads are long-time stalwarts
of the MPR, and the departing chiefs are not straying far from power.
The eminent jurists to which the President referred are Mr. Nimy to
replace Nkema Liloo as security advisor and General Likulia to replace
Cit. Ngbanda as head of the AND. Mr. Nimy was the minister in charge
of the DCRL from 1986 to 1989. Before that time, he was the chief of
staff for the Presidency. General Likulia has held a variety of offices in
the MPR government and military for a number of years. Moreover, the
replaced security chiefs did not fall far from favor. As in earlier shuffles,
the replaced security chiefs moved on to other positions of importance
within the President's staff. Cit. Ngbanda was appointed to be a political
counselor to the President and Cit. Nkema was appointed ambassador to
England.
In an interview published in Jeune Afrique, the President suggested
that change was likely to go no further. When asked about the need to
restructure the security forces, the President responded:
The will of the people was very clear on this subject. It demanded the
restructuring of the security forces with a view to guaranteeing the
full exercise of individual liberties. The changes among the heads of
certain of these forces, already announced, will assure this. In addition,
we will revise the laws which organize these forces in order to increase
their efficiency.82
On May 22, 1990, National Security Council, under Mr. Nimy's
guidance, announced a series of measures to end unlawful detention and
80. President Mobutu, Speech (May 3, 1990).
81. Id.
82. Interview with President Mobutu, JEUNE AFIiQUE 19 (May 21, 1990).
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improve judicial supervision of security force practices. What is intriguing
about the announced measures is that they contradict the claims made by
the government since 1987, that all arrests and detention were made
pursuant to the Criminal Code. For example, the Council announced the
"abolition of all administrative detention," and the "liberation of all
persons detained by security forces for political reasons or for their
opinions." The announcement included some new "reforms." It stated
that detention centers would be subject to the exclusive control of the
judicial authorities. However, as with previous reforms, there is no
indication that they have been put into place. In July, a representative of
the Zairian government told the United Nations Human Rights Committee
that the measures would have to await ratification by the National
Assembly.
Conclusion
There is always hope in the announcement of reforms. This time in
particular, President Mobutu has unleashed a process that has taken on
a momentum of its own. Zairians have come to believe there will be
substantial political liberalization in the near future. But it already appears
clear that the President will not complete the process willingly. The people
of Zaire will have to force the President to fulfill the modest reforms
that he promised. As they have for twenty-five years, the security forces
will occupy the President's first line of defense and offense, if necessary.
It seems clear from the historical role that the security forces have
played notwithstanding the constant announcements of reforms that no
real change will come to Zaire until they are dismantled, substantially or
completely.
